Definition:
Consciousness is an individual’s subjective experience of mental states and processes associated with perception, thoughts, emotions and self-reflection. It encompasses both phenomenal experience (the ‘how it feels’) and the ability to perceive and control oneself.
Discussion:
- Basic Theories of Consciousness:
a) Integrated Information Theory (IIT):
The IIT developed by Giulio Tononi postulates that consciousness is a fundamental property of systems with a high level of integrated information [1]. According to this theory, consciousness arises when a system has a certain amount and structure of integrated information, quantified by the value Φ (Phi).
Main Features of the IIT:
- Consciousness is gradual and can occur in different intensities.
- It is an intrinsic property of complex, integrated systems.
- The theory provides a mathematical framework for quantifying consciousness.
b) Global Workspace Theory (GWT):
The GWT proposed by Bernard Baars describes consciousness as a ‘global workspace’ in which information from various specialised brain modules is integrated and made available for higher cognitive functions [2].
Main Features of GWT:
- Bewusste Erfahrungen entstehen, wenn Informationen in den globalen Arbeitsbereich gelangen.
- Es gibt einen Wettbewerb zwischen verschiedenen Informationen um den Zugang zum Bewusstsein.
- Die Theorie erklärt den sequentiellen, fokussierten Charakter bewusster Erfahrungen.
c) Consciousness and intelligence according to Henry Shevlin:
Shevlin argues in favour of a close link between consciousness and general intelligence [3]. He proposes that three main characteristics of general intelligence can serve as indicators of consciousness:
a) Robustness: The ability to master tasks despite disruptions.
b) Flexibility: The ability to transfer knowledge to new tasks.
c) System-wide integration: The ability to integrate and effectively balance inputs from different systems.
Shevlin’s approach offers an interesting perspective on the assessment of consciousness in biological and artificial systems. He argues that many animals exhibit these characteristics to a high degree, while current AI systems are still far behind in this respect.
- Extension of the Discussion:
The link between consciousness and intelligence, as proposed by Shevlin, can be reconciled with the basic theories of consciousness:
- IIT: The system-wide integration that Shevlin describes could be understood as a manifestation of the integrated information that IIT sees as fundamental to consciousness.
- GWT: The flexibility and robustness that Shevlin emphasises could be interpreted as the result of a well-functioning global workspace that efficiently integrates and processes information from different modules.
Nevertheless, there are important questions and challenges:
- Gradualness of consciousness: While IIT views consciousness as gradual, it is unclear whether and how Shevlin’s approach can capture gradual differences in consciousness.
- Qualia and phenomenal consciousness: Shevlin’s focus on general intelligence may not directly address the question of the subjective, qualitative experience of consciousness.
- Artificial systems: Applying these criteria to artificial systems remains challenging, as they might develop forms of intelligence that are not directly comparable to biological systems.
- Neural correlates of consciousness: The relationship between the proposed characteristics of general intelligence and specific neural mechanisms of consciousness remains to be clarified.
To summarise, the integration of theories such as IIT and GWT with approaches that combine consciousness and general intelligence could be a promising avenue for a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness. This synthesis could be important both for the study of consciousness in biological systems and for the development of potentially conscious artificial systems.
[Excerpt from chapter 4 of the manuscript]
Investigating the neuronal basis of inner images has led us to the fundamental question of the nature of consciousness. How does a coherent, subjective experience emerge from the distributed patterns of activity in the brain? What role do phenomena such as neuronal synchronisation and phase coupling, which we have previously examined, play in human consciousness? These questions are at the centre of consciousness research and philosophical theories, which we will now address.
In recent decades, considerable progress has been made in consciousness research, particularly in neurobiologically based theories such as Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT).
IIT postulates that the amount of integrated information present in a system corresponds to the level of consciousness in that system. In terms of neuronal activity, for example, IIT would be closely related to phenomena such as the phase synchronisation described above.
However, there is still no consensus on the nature of consciousness, especially in the so-called ‘hard problem’ and the nature of subjective experience. In other words, how an empathetic sensation can emerge from the sum of stimuli, impulses and synchronisations of organic matter.
Literature:
[1] Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC neuroscience, 5(1), 42.
[2] Baars, B. J. (1997). In the theater of consciousness: The workspace of the mind. Oxford University Press.
[3] Shevlin, H. (2024). To build conscious machines, focus on general intelligence: a framework for the assessment of consciousness in biological and artificial systems.